Ukraine war: Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports and cargo vessels have intensified at the start of the Black Sea grain-export season. On September 12, Moscow said it had struck two ships at Chornomorsk and another at Odesa, claiming that they carried military supplies. Ukraine reported heavy damage and civilian casualties across the Odesa region. The claims about the ships have not been independently verified. The disruption to agricultural trade is already measurable.
Since June, Russia has attacked at least 57 cargo vessels in the Black Sea, according to Ukrainian officials. Ukraine has responded by striking Russian ports and ships, including facilities at Novorossiysk and Taman. A waterway that carries a large share of the world’s traded wheat is becoming too dangerous for routine commerce.
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The immediate consequence is a reduction in grain shipments from both countries. The larger risk is less visible. Farmers who cannot sell this year’s harvest will lack storage space and working capital for the next crop. What begins as a shipping disruption can therefore become a production shock lasting several seasons.
Black Sea attacks hit the wheat trade
Russia and Ukraine together account for about 27% of global wheat exports, according to the US Department of Agriculture. Russia is the largest exporter and Ukraine the fifth largest. Both depend heavily on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov during the late-summer export season.
Russia’s attacks have taken much of Ukraine’s Black Sea shipping capacity out of operation. Ukraine exported about 1.4 million tonnes of grain in a recent period when it could have shipped roughly three times that volume, according to its food minister. August exports were expected to fall to about one-third of their level a year earlier.
Ukraine’s strikes have also reduced Russian capacity. Novorossiysk ordinarily handles about 40% of Russian grain exports, while the Sea of Azov accounts for another substantial share. Analysts cited by the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimate that attacks may have removed about 70% of Russia’s grain-export capacity. Russian wheat exports in August could have been as much as 70% below their recent average.
There is an important distinction between the two campaigns. Russia began the full-scale invasion and has attacked Ukraine’s farms, silos, processing plants, railways, Danube terminals and Black Sea ports since 2022. Ukraine’s recent attacks on Russian export infrastructure form part of its effort to impair the economy sustaining the invasion. This does not make their effects on food markets identical in law or intent. It does mean that buyers face disruption at both ends of a major grain corridor.
Commercial shipping responds to risk before governments agree on responsibility. Crews refuse dangerous voyages, insurers raise premiums and owners withdraw vessels. In July, attacks on 35 ships reportedly killed 23 people, more seafarers than had died in such attacks during the previous years of the war. The danger now extends beyond vessels berthed at Ukrainian ports.
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Food prices have begun to respond
The latest shock has arrived in a market already short of comfortable margins. Hot and dry weather has reduced production prospects in parts of Europe. Supplies from other major exporters face pressure from drought, input costs and the developing El Niño. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has raised concerns about fuel and fertiliser supplies.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation reported that world wheat prices rose 2.6% in August and stood 15% above their level a year earlier. It attributed the increase partly to persistent problems with Black Sea logistics. Maize prices rose 2.5% during the month, with restricted Ukrainian exports among the causes. Barley prices also moved higher.
These increases remain well below the surge that followed Russia’s invasion in 2022. Importing countries are better prepared than they were four years ago, and some have rebuilt stocks. Alternative suppliers can capture part of the market. The world is not about to run out of grain.
That is scant comfort to poor food-importing countries. Global availability and household affordability are different questions. A modest increase in world prices can impose a severe burden where currencies are weak, debt-service costs are high and governments cannot finance food subsidies. Egypt, Turkey and several countries in Africa and West Asia depend heavily on Black Sea wheat. Families adjust by reducing consumption, shifting to cheaper staples and cutting protein-rich food.
The distribution of the damage is therefore perverse. Russia and Ukraine lose export revenue. Shipowners and insurers charge more. Governments of importing countries face larger subsidy bills. The heaviest cost falls on households with no connection to the war.
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The next harvest is the greater danger
Ukraine can move some grain through the Danube, railways and European Union “Solidarity Lanes”. Russia is redirecting cargo towards the Baltic, Caspian and Pacific routes. These alternatives cost more and cannot match the volumes handled by Black Sea ports.
The Danube route has its own limits. Low water levels have reduced vessel capacity and raised freight charges. Russia has also attacked the Ukrainian river ports of Izmail and Reni. Rail transport encounters changes in track gauge at the EU border, congestion and higher costs. Ukraine’s agriculture minister estimates that alternative routes could carry only half the volume normally handled by the disrupted seaports.
The result will be felt on Ukrainian farms. Grain that cannot leave the country fills silos needed for the next harvest. Lower sales deprive farmers of money for seed, fertiliser, diesel and wages. Recent disruptions could cost Ukraine’s agricultural sector as much as $3 billion. If shipments do not resume, export capacity lost in 2026 could reduce planting and output in 2027.
Russia can absorb the financial damage more easily because it has a larger agricultural sector and more alternative ports. Yet rerouting its grain cannot fully replace Black Sea capacity. Restrictions on Russian terminals may also affect fertiliser exports, transmitting the shock to farmers far beyond the region.
Safe passage needs enforceable terms
The Black Sea Grain Initiative demonstrated that diplomacy could reduce the food-market costs of the war. It enabled nearly 33 million tonnes of Ukrainian agricultural products to leave Black Sea ports between July 2022 and July 2023. Russia later withdrew, arguing that restrictions affecting its own food and fertiliser trade had not been adequately addressed.
A simple revival of that arrangement appears unlikely. Ukraine objected to Russian control over vessel inspections, which allowed Moscow to slow shipments. Its subsequent maritime corridor moved larger volumes without Russian inspection. Neither government now trusts a regime that gives the other side leverage over trade.
Turkey has proposed a new safe-passage plan. Any workable agreement will require a reciprocal ban on attacks against civilian vessels and agricultural export facilities, independent monitoring and consequences for violations. War-risk insurance will also need public backing until private insurers regain confidence.
Food corridors cannot substitute for peace. They can, however, prevent a military contest from being charged to families in countries that neither started the war nor possess the means to escape its prices. Keeping grain routes open is a limited demand. Its humanitarian and economic return would be unusually large.