Trump tariffs hand China a diplomatic opening: The spectacle of Prime Minister Narendra Modi attending the SCO summit in Tianjin, shaking hands with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, tells a story far larger than regional diplomacy. It is the unintended consequence of Donald Trump’s tariff war on India. By imposing punitive 50% tariffs on Indian goods and penalising India’s oil purchases from Russia — transactions once tacitly encouraged by Washington — the US president has committed a geopolitical blunder. Instead of bending to Washington’s will, India is recalibrating its foreign policy, drawing closer to China and Russia, and signalling that its strategic autonomy is non-negotiable.
Trump’s worldview treats tariffs as imperial tribute: raise barriers until adversaries and allies alike submit. Yet the assumption that India will cede ground under pressure is both naïve and dangerous. India’s red lines are clear. Agricultural markets will not be opened on US terms, energy purchases will not be dictated by Washington, and security commitments will not be outsourced to the White House.
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The Reserve Bank of India has noted that while the domestic economy remains resilient, trade tensions with the US pose significant downside risks. Export sectors that depend heavily on US markets — from textiles to pharmaceuticals — are now facing uncertainty. But New Delhi calculates that capitulation would project weakness. Far better to diversify trade partners and demonstrate that Washington cannot take India for granted.
Tianjin as a stage for multipolarity
The SCO is not NATO. Its members — China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Central Asian states — harbour rivalries and lack binding defence obligations. Yet appearances in geopolitics matter. To see Modi, Xi, and Putin together underlines Washington’s absence. Trump, by weaponising tariffs, has inadvertently elevated Tianjin into a theatre where non-Western powers display solidarity.
For Beijing, the rewards are immediate. Hosting Modi for the first time in seven years, Xi Jinping stressed that India and China are “partners, not rivals.” Symbolic though this may be, it chips away at the US strategy of cultivating India as a counterweight to China. Russia, for its part, gains legitimacy as sanctions fail to isolate it. Iran and Turkey find in the SCO a forum to challenge US unilateralism. Each handshake in Tianjin weakens Washington’s claim to global leadership.
India’s strategic autonomy under strain
India’s foreign policy doctrine of strategic autonomy has long emphasised flexibility — aligning with different blocs without surrendering sovereignty. Successive US administrations invested in building India into an Indo-Pacific partner, from defence agreements to technology transfers. Yet Trump’s tariffs test that foundation.
The irony is striking. After years of cultivating New Delhi as a bulwark against Beijing, Washington now risks driving India into China’s embrace. Already, bilateral ties between Delhi and Beijing have seen tentative normalisation. The 2020 Galwan clashes left deep scars, but both governments agreed last year to disengage troops and reopen civilian exchanges. Now, under pressure from Washington, India has urgency to stabilise relations with its largest neighbour and second-largest trading partner.
Economic imperative of China trade
Trade realities reinforce diplomacy. China is India’s second-largest trading partner after the US, with bilateral trade topping $118 billion last year. India depends on China not only for finished goods but also for intermediate products vital to its manufacturing industries. Curtailing this interdependence is neither feasible nor desirable in the short term.
By contrast, Trump’s tariffs directly threaten Indian exports to the US, narrowing India’s economic options. Rather than remain cornered, New Delhi sees value in hedging: keeping Washington close, but opening the door wider to Beijing and Moscow. This dual track is not a repudiation of the US but a pragmatic recognition that economic security cannot rest on a single pillar.
Trump tariffs: Weakening of the western coalition
The larger implication of Trump’s tariffs is the erosion of Washington’s ability to mobilise global coalitions. The SCO summit already illustrated this trend. With leaders from across Asia, the Middle East, and even parts of Europe in attendance, the forum highlighted common grievances against unilateral US actions. From Ukraine to the Middle East, the harder Washington presses, the easier it becomes for rivals to present themselves as defenders of multipolarity.
India’s presence at Tianjin is particularly significant. As the world’s largest democracy and a key member of the Quad, its symbolic tilt towards Beijing undermines the Western narrative of a united democratic front. Trump’s fixation on transactional tariffs risks forfeiting a strategic partnership painstakingly built over decades.
A costly geopolitical blunder
History suggests that great powers stumble not only by overreach but also by misreading allies. Trump’s tariff war exemplifies this. By punishing India for pursuing its national interests — whether in energy security or agricultural protection — Washington has transformed a friend into a sceptical partner.
The consequences will not be immediate abandonment of the US. India values its defence cooperation with Washington and recognises the importance of the Indo-Pacific partnership. But the balance has shifted. Beijing now has an opening to ease India away from Western alignment. Moscow gains breathing space as sanctions falter. For Washington, this is a costly miscalculation.
Charting a smarter course
The United States must recognise that India’s partnership cannot be built on coercion. Tariffs and sanctions only drive Delhi to seek alternatives. Instead, Washington should return to a strategy of mutual respect and pragmatic cooperation. This requires three steps.
First, recalibrate trade policy to focus on negotiated solutions rather than punitive tariffs. Indian exports should not be caught in the crossfire of US geopolitical battles. Second, broaden cooperation in areas where interests converge — climate action, technology, defence manufacturing — so that the partnership rests on multiple foundations. Third, respect India’s strategic autonomy. Energy purchases from Russia or cautious engagement with China should not be seen as betrayals, but as expressions of a sovereign foreign policy.
Trump’s tariff war on India may appear to be an assertion of American strength. In reality, it risks undermining Washington’s most important partnership in Asia and accelerating the very multipolarity that the US seeks to resist. India will not abandon the US, but neither will it yield its autonomy. If compelled to choose, New Delhi will hedge, deepening ties with Beijing and Moscow.
For America, the lesson is clear. Great powers do not retain influence through coercion; they do so by building trust, offering value, and respecting sovereignty. If Washington fails to learn this, Tianjin may be remembered as the moment when India—courted for decades as a democratic partner—turned away, nudged not by its rivals, but by the tariffs of its supposed ally.