What happens when the indispensable becomes dispensable? That is the question confronting the NATO alliance today, as US President Donald Trump renews threats of withdrawal, budget cuts, and strategic realignments that could turn Europe’s shield into a shell.
To understand the gravity of this moment, one must go beyond partisan outrage and diplomatic parlance. A closer look reveals that the Atlantic alliance — founded in 1949 as a bulwark against Soviet aggression and a guarantor of post-war peace — is now more vulnerable than at any time in its 75-year history. The danger does not stem from Russia alone, nor from the familiar debates over military spending and burden-sharing. It emanates from within — from the political will of the United States, the very anchor of the alliance.
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The budget guillotine
A leaked proposal from the Office of Management and Budget, still in its preliminary stages, reveals the Trump administration’s intent to slash the State Department’s funding by nearly 50%, eliminate support for key international institutions, and even defund NATO headquarters. The move, critics rightly argue, signals not just fiscal conservatism but a broader retreat from America’s post-war role as a global leader.
One can reasonably argue that such proposals are unlikely to pass intact. Congress has historically rejected deep cuts to the State Department, and bipartisan voices continue to recognise Atlantic alliance’s strategic importance. But the concern is not procedural — it is directional. The signal from Washington is unmistakable: the US no longer views Europe’s security as its primary responsibility. Instead, it is pivoting toward border control, the Indo-Pacific, and a domestic agenda cantered on nationalism and fiscal austerity.
What would Europe lose?
The American security guarantee is not symbolic; it is institutional and operational. The United States is not just a partner in NATO — it is the skeleton. From command structure to surveillance systems, from strategic lift to nuclear deterrence, Europe depends on American muscle to make Article 5 — the alliance’s collective defence clause — more than just paper.
Today, only five NATO countries meet the guideline of spending 3% of their GDP on defence. The United States contributes nearly 70% of the alliance’s total military expenditures. If that spine is removed, Europe will not just face a fiscal shock. It will confront a strategic vacuum that no amount of short-term spending can immediately fill.
Estimates suggest that to match America’s role, European NATO members would need to spend an additional €250 billion annually, or roughly 1.5% of EU GDP. Friedrich Merz, frontrunner to succeed Olaf Scholz as German Chancellor, proposes spending €1 trillion over 10 years — a bold commitment but still far from operational readiness. Even with rising defence budgets in the UK, Poland, and Denmark, Europe lacks key strategic enablers: integrated missile defence systems, transport aircraft, and long-range precision strike capabilities.
The time and personnel deficit
Time, however, may be NATO’s most elusive asset. As General Ben Hodges, former commander of the US Army in Europe, warns, Europe will need at least a decade to rebuild the personnel, logistics, and operational cohesion that the United States currently supplies. Most European militaries are small, under-resourced, and bureaucratically constrained. Some countries, like Germany, legally prohibit weapons production without direct government orders — a procedural bottleneck that disables any rapid scale-up.
Moreover, attracting and retaining high-quality recruits in advanced military roles is proving increasingly difficult, especially as wages and job security remain more attractive in civilian sectors. The idea of placing peacekeeping troops in Ukraine — floated by some European strategists — would only stretch existing capacities thinner.
The strategic fallout
The consequences of an abrupt US withdrawal would be far-reaching. Vladimir Putin, watching closely from the Kremlin, would interpret such a move not merely as a geopolitical pivot but as a historic fracture in the post-1945 order. Russia’s military, though bloodied and depleted in Ukraine, would likely test the alliance’s eastern flank — especially in the Baltics or Black Sea — should American deterrence fade.
In response, some experts advocate for a new European strategic doctrine — a “porcupine defence” combining drones, long-range missiles, cyber warfare, and hardened infrastructure to make any Russian advance prohibitively costly. Others suggest reviving the long-dormant idea of a European Army, under a unified command but integrated with NATO assets.
Yet, none of these ideas can succeed without cooperation from the United States. As Daalder notes, even a phased transition from US-led defence to a European-led model requires time, resources, and most of all, synchronisation. Any unilateral American retreat would rupture that delicate equilibrium and make Europe more, not less, vulnerable.
What NATO must do
First, Europe must take Trump seriously. For too long, European capitals have dismissed his threats as campaign bluster. But the reconfiguration of US strategic priorities is already underway. The US Indo-Pacific Command is rising in influence, while European Command is being quietly sidelined. Even SACEUR — the US general who leads NATO’s European forces — may be replaced by a European, ending a tradition dating back to Eisenhower.
Second, the alliance must rethink its decision-making structure. Unanimous voting, while symbolic of equality, paralyses swift action. A rotating senior council with qualified majority voting on administrative matters could streamline operations without undermining consensus on critical military decisions.
Third, it must revise its financial architecture. The 2% defence-spending guideline, while useful as a benchmark, must be accompanied by performance-based metrics — measuring capabilities, not just expenditure. Equally, the European Investment Bank must lift restrictions on defence loans, and governments must pre-order defence equipment to unlock industrial capacity.
The tragedy of the alliance’s current crisis is that it is not inevitable. The alliance has weathered worse — Vietnam, Suez, the Cold War, Iraq. But what it cannot survive is the absence of a plan. Europe must begin treating American unreliability not as an anomaly but as a scenario to prepare for. A porcupine without quills is easy prey.
If the United States does walk away, the blame will not lie solely in Washington. Europe’s complacency, delayed response, and lack of political cohesion have made NATO vulnerable. The alliance may still endure, but only if its members remember the lesson of 1949: security, once lost, is not easily regained.