The Union cabinet’s clearance of the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy (SHANTI) Bill marks the most consequential shift in India’s civil nuclear policy in decades. By proposing amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010, the government has signalled its intent to open the sector to private and foreign participation. The stated objective is ambitious: 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047, up from about 9 GW today, as part of India’s long-term decarbonisation strategy.
The timing matters. Electricity demand is rising faster than in most large economies, driven by industrial expansion, urbanisation, and data-led growth. Yet nuclear power contributes barely 2% of installed capacity, while coal still supplies nearly three-quarters of generation, according to the Central Electricity Authority. The SHANTI Bill seeks to alter this imbalance. But ambition alone does not alter outcomes. Nuclear power is capital-intensive, slow to deploy, legally complex, and politically sensitive. Overstretching the programme risks repeating a familiar cycle of inflated targets followed by quiet revision.
READ | How AI could hurt — and help — local journalism
The 100-GW target risks repeating past overreach
India’s nuclear programme has long struggled to reconcile aspiration with delivery. In 2010, official projections placed nuclear capacity at 63 GW by 2031–32. That estimate did not survive contact with land acquisition constraints, fuel supply issues, and persistent construction delays. According to S&P Global Commodity Insights, India has added only 4.1 GW of nuclear capacity since 2010, despite sustained political endorsement.
The new target implies adding more than 4 GW annually for over two decades. Even allowing for fleet-mode construction and standardisation, this exceeds India’s demonstrated execution capacity by a wide margin. About 14 GW is expected to come online over the next 15 years, largely through 700-MW pressurised heavy water reactors. That still leaves a substantial gap.
This gap is not a technical problem. It is a governance problem.
Nuclear projects typically require 10–15 years from approval to commissioning. Delays raise financing costs, weaken tariff viability, and strain public confidence. The World Bank has repeatedly noted that nuclear projects globally record among the highest cost overruns in the power sector. Targets that ignore this record risk becoming political artefacts rather than planning instruments.
Private participation will not erase structural constraints
The SHANTI Bill correctly acknowledges that public capital alone cannot support a large nuclear expansion. Allowing private ownership, operations, and fuel-cycle participation may introduce construction discipline and financial depth. But private capital does not dissolve nuclear-specific risk.
Liability remains the central deterrent. India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act caps operator liability but allows open-ended recourse against suppliers. This diverges from international practice under frameworks such as the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. The result has been predictable: hesitation by global technology providers since the 2008 civil nuclear agreement.
Private capital prices risk faster than the Indian state has been willing to acknowledge.
Tariff governance is another unresolved constraint. Nuclear tariffs remain administratively determined rather than competitively discovered. Shifting oversight to the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission may improve transparency, but revenue certainty will still depend on long-term contracts in a market increasingly shaped by low-cost renewables. Liberalisation without regulatory depth increases systemic exposure rather than reducing it.
Small modular reactors promise flexibility, not scale
Small modular reactors occupy a prominent place in India’s Nuclear Energy Mission. Their reduced footprint, passive safety features, and suitability for captive industrial use make them attractive on paper. India’s Bharat Small Reactor programme aims to replace captive coal plants and support industrial decarbonisation in anticipation of compliance carbon markets and trade measures such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.
What is discussed less openly is their commercial uncertainty.
Globally, SMRs remain largely unproven. Only China and Russia operate them commercially. According to S&P Global Commodity Insights, less than 10 GW of SMR capacity is under development worldwide. Costs remain high. Imported or codeveloped SMRs could cost two to three times more than India’s indigenous PHWRs, raising questions of affordability and scale.
SMRs solve spatial problems. They do not solve economic ones. Even optimistic projections suggest no more than five SMRs operational by 2040, making their contribution to the 100-GW target marginal. They are best viewed as a specialised solution for industrial clusters, not a substitute for large-scale generation.
Nuclear must compete with faster decarbonisation options
India’s climate challenge is immediate. Power-sector emissions must peak early if the 2070 net-zero commitment is to remain credible, according to assessments by NITI Aayog and the International Energy Agency. Nuclear power offers firm baseload generation, but its climate value depends on speed of deployment.
Renewables are moving faster. India has added over 100 GW of renewable capacity in a decade, supported by rapid cost declines. By the 2030s, storage-integrated renewables are expected to deliver firm power at competitive prices, according to the IEA. Nuclear plants, by contrast, are poorly suited to flexible ramping, complicating their integration into a grid dominated by variable generation.
There is also strategic exposure. Nuclear infrastructure is sensitive to geopolitical shocks, fuel supply risks, and wartime threats. Building resilience demands costly safeguards and contingency planning. Overcommitting resources to nuclear could crowd out investments in transmission, storage, and efficiency—areas that offer quicker and surer climate returns.
Nuclear policy: The case for calibrated ambition
The SHANTI Bill reflects a necessary willingness to revisit outdated legal frameworks. Private participation and international collaboration are essential if nuclear power is to retain relevance in India’s energy mix. But relevance does not require scale without restraint.
Nuclear capacity should grow steadily, not spectacularly. Priority must be given to completing existing projects, consolidating fleet-mode construction, and piloting SMRs where they offer demonstrable industrial value. Legal reform must proceed alongside regulatory strengthening and transparent tariff-setting.
India’s energy transition will not be judged by capacity targets alone. It will be judged by how quickly reliable power displaces coal at acceptable cost. On that measure, institutional realism may prove more valuable than ambition.