Sudan civil war: A nation caught between armies and hunger

Sudan civil war, now in its third year, has assumed a dangerous dimension. It is more than a contest between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The Sudanese crisis has turned into a national calamity with the breakdown of the state, the collapse of the economy, and the failure of a delicate democratic transition. Cities have been emptied, food has become scarce, and millions have been forced to flee. What began as a struggle for control in Khartoum has become one of Africa’s glaring experiences of failed governance, where power, money, and survival have undermined the prospects of civilian rule.

Today, more than 40% of the world’s wars are in Africa, and Sudan has become a threatening focal point of this “economic bloodshed”, where control of resources – especially gold – matters more than questions of ideology or constitutional order. The result is a war economy that sustains violence even as it destroys the society that feeds it. Sudan’s strategic position, straddling the Arab world and Sub-Saharan Africa and bordering seven states, has always made it challenging. But its modern history is a cycle of civil wars, coups, and broken peace agreements. 

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Sudan civil war: Historical fault lines 

A brief glance at Sudan’s post-colonial history already explains much of today’s catastrophe. Since independence in 1956, Sudan has gone through 35 coups or coup attempts – more than any other African country. The state never became a neutral arbiter between its citizens – it remained the lever of competing elites in Khartoum.

Two structural problems stand out. First, early governments insisted on an Arab–Islamic identity based on Mahdism, marginalising non-Arab and non-Muslim populations in the South, the Nuba Mountains, and Darfur. Sudan is home to about 49–50 million people, 19 major ethnic groups and hundreds of sub-groups, and political and economic power stayed in the riverine centre around Khartoum. This uneven nation-building project fuelled rebellions that stretched from the southern civil wars to the Darfur uprising.

Secondly, the 1989 coup brought Omar al-Bashir and the National Islamic Front to power. They intensified Islamisation, built a vast security apparatus, and crushed dissent. In 2003, to crush rebellion in Darfur, the regime unleashed Arab militias – the Janjaweed – who later became the RSF, formally incorporated into the state’s security architecture in 2013 and 2017. 

South Sudan’s secession in 2011 ended one of Africa’s longest civil wars but removed 75% of Sudan’s oil reserves and 95% of export earnings, pushing the country into economic crisis and dependence on external patrons. Mass protests over corruption and collapsing living standards toppled Bashir in 2019, raising hopes for a new social contract. But the transitional arrangement tilted heavily toward the military, with Burhan and Hemedti controlling the guns and much of the economy. The October 2021 coup by Burhan destroyed this delicate transition and set the stage for open war in April 2023 when tensions over security-sector reform and control of economic networks exploded into full-scale conflict. 

The hidden economy behind the conflict

The current conflict began as a rivalry between the SAF and RSF. It has turned out to be a war mapped by extraction rather than ideology. Gold, oil, land and ports now determine thebattlefield. After the loss of oil to South Sudan, gold became Sudan’s main export, officially earning about $1.57 billion in 2024. But up to 80–90% of gold is believed to be smuggled, much of it from Darfur and Kordofan, areas now largely under RSF control.

The RSF earns hundreds of millions of dollars each year from illicit gold mining and smuggling networks that run through Libya, Chad and especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where Sudanese gold is refined and enters global markets with little traceability. The SAF, by contrast, depends on shrinking state revenues and external backing. This asymmetry has allowed the RSF to operate as a near-autonomous militia-state, with its own gold income, business networks and foreign patrons.

Involvement of External Actors

Sudan’s revolution and counter-revolution cannot be understood without the role of the Gulf monarchies and Egypt. Under Bashir, Sudan turned from Iran and Qatar towards Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, sending thousands of troops – many from the RSF – to fight in Yemen in return for billions in cash, fuel and subsidies.

When protests erupted in 2018–19, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt backed Burhan and Hemedti’s coup against Bashirand then against the civilians who led the revolution. They pledged $3 billion to the Transitional Military Council and provided diplomatic cover as security forces massacred sit-in protesters in June 2019. Gulf support helped entrench a military-dominated transition and weakened civilian forces, directly paving the way to the 2021 coup and the 2023 war.

For the UAE in particular, Sudan is a strategic frontier – a source of gold, cheap agricultural land, port concessions on the Red Sea, and a hub for Emirati-linked banks. Sudanese gold, often controlled by Hemedti’s family firms, has flowed into Emirati refineries. Gulf agribusiness has sought vast land leases, and Emirati port and logistics companies have pushed for long-term control of Red Sea infrastructure. 

Egypt, meanwhile, leans more toward the SAF and Burhan, seeing Sudan as vital to Nile security and its own regime stability. It has coordinated closely with Gulf capitals during key turning points and has hosted opposition figures and security talks.

China has remained deeply involved in Sudan through major investments in oil, ports, and infrastructure along the Nile and the Red Sea, linking the country to its Belt and Road network. Russia’s Wagner Group built influence by securing gold and military access through ties with the RSF, while the United States and its partners have shifted between sanctions, mediation efforts like the Jeddah talks, and humanitarian interventions. India’s engagement is limited but strategic, as Red Sea instability threatens its trade and energy routes.

For ordinary Sudanese, these overlapping foreign interests have turned their country into a battleground of global rivalries. Gulf money and weapons empowered generals over civilians, fuelling the war’s prolongation. The UAE’s later admission that it “made a mistake” backing the 2021 coup offers little solace to a nation already devastated by outside meddling.

Social collapse, famine and a shattered economy

The human cost of the war is alarming. By mid-2025, more than 14 million Sudanese had been displaced internally or across borders – the largest displacement crisis in the world. Millions have fled to Egypt, Chad, South Sudan and beyond. Others are trapped in besieged cities like El Fasher and Kadugli.

A UN-backed Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis has confirmed famine conditions in El Fasher (North Darfur) and Kadugli (South Kordofan), with about 21.2 million people – around 45% of Sudan’s population – facing high levels of acute food insecurity. Malnutrition rates in some areas are catastrophic, and cholera, malaria and measles are spreading as water, health and sanitation systems collapse.  

The RSF’s capture of El Fasher after an 18-month siege has been accompanied by reports of mass killings, sexual violence and mass graves, while tens of thousands fled towards already overcrowded towns such as Tawila. In Darfur and Kordofan, entire communities survive on animal feed, leaves and polluted water. UN agencies warn that without a ceasefire and full humanitarian access, famine could spread to 20 more areas across Darfur and Kordofan. 

Lessons from Sudan’s collapse

The economic consequences are equally devastating. IFPRI estimates that war-related losses already exceed $26 billion – more than half of Sudan’s pre-war GDP – and that, if fighting continues, total output could shrink by up to 42% compared to 2022 levels. Industrial output has fallen by more than 50%, services by about 40%, and agriculture by 35% in the most extreme scenario. Millions of jobs have vanished, and poverty rates have soared. 

The World Bank reports that real GDP fell by nearly 30% in 2023 and a further sharp contraction in 2024, while inflation reached 170% before easing slightly in 2025. Government revenue has dropped below 5% of GDP, crippling the state’s ability to provide even basic services. Extreme poverty has leapt from 23% (2022) to almost 60% (2024). 

Agriculture, long the backbone of Sudan’s economy, has been ravaged. Cereal production is far below previous years and key regions like Gezira have seen their fields looted or occupied by armed groups. Markets have been bombed, livestock stolen, and forests and gum Arabic areas abandoned. 

This breakdown is not just national. South Sudan’s oil-dependent economy has contracted by nearly a quarter because pipelines and facilities on Sudanese territory have been attacked, leading to spills, shutdowns and revenue losses. Anadolu Ajansı Abyei and other border areas have become militarised corridors of displacement and insecurity – a reminder that the Sudanese war is also a regional crisis.

Nearly three years into the war, Sudan’s peace process is trapped in deadlock. Mediation efforts — from the African Union and IGAD to the US–Saudi Jeddah talks and the “Quad” group of Egypt and the Gulf states — have yielded only brief pauses in fighting. The two warring blocs still see war as a means of survival and profit. The RSF thrives on control of gold fields and smuggling routes, while the army and its allies rely on customs revenues and foreign aid networks. A ceasefire that threatens these interests holds little appeal for either side.