State fiscal deficits set to fall, but spending pressures remain

State fiscal deficits
State governments have budgeted a lower fiscal deficit for 2026–27, but rising welfare and rural employment costs could squeeze investment.

State fiscal deficits set to fall, but spending pressures remain: India’s states have budgeted for a combined fiscal deficit of 2.9% of GDP in 2026–27, down from 3.4% in the previous year’s revised estimates, after excluding the Centre’s interest-free loans for capital investment. The November report from PRS Legislative Research also puts their combined revenue deficit at 0.2% of GDP. That shortfall means current revenues still fall short of day-to-day spending.

The lower fiscal deficit is welcome, but the durability of the improvement depends on what states borrow for and how much of their revenue is already spoken for. These are the governments that build much of the infrastructure businesses depend on and provide essential services such as schooling and healthcare.

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State budgets plan for faster capital spending

The aggregate deficit masks wide differences. PRS identifies nine jurisdictions in its analysis with budgeted deficits above 3% of gross state domestic product, the benchmark recommended by the 16th Finance Commission for states. On the same measure, Jammu and Kashmir, a Union Territory, has budgeted a deficit of 3.7%, while Himachal Pradesh and Meghalaya are at 3.5% each. Including the Centre’s interest-free capital loans, the combined deficit is budgeted at 3.2% of GDP.

States and the Union Territories covered by PRS plan to spend ₹68.79 lakh crore in 2026–27, 62% more than the Centre’s ₹42.53 lakh crore after excluding central grants and loans to states. Of that, ₹56.36 lakh crore is revenue expenditure and ₹12.43 lakh crore is capital expenditure. The latter is budgeted to rise at an annualised rate of 20% from actual spending in 2024–25, against 13% for revenue expenditure. Whether states deliver that increase will become clear from their accounts.

Two states with similar deficits can have very different fiscal prospects. Borrowing for a well-chosen road or irrigation project can yield economic returns for years. A poorly chosen project can leave the state servicing debt and paying for upkeep long after construction ends. Schools and hospitals, meanwhile, need staff and supplies to make use of the buildings that capital budgets pay for. The strain comes when recurring commitments rise faster than the revenues available to finance them.

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State fiscal deficits: Cash transfers add to recurring commitments

States expect to spend 52% of their revenue receipts on salaries, pensions and interest in 2026–27. These bills are difficult to reduce quickly. Subsidies and transfers have also taken up a larger share of receipts, rising from 16% in 2018–19 to 21% in 2023–24. The RBI’s January study of state budgets put outstanding liabilities at 29.2% of GDP at end-March 2026 on a budget-estimate basis. States with large interest bills have less room to keep investment on schedule when collections disappoint.

PRS estimates that states have earmarked about ₹4 lakh crore for unconditional cash transfers in 2026–27, equivalent to 1% of GDP, up from 0.6% in 2022–23. These schemes can give households a reliable source of support, particularly where earnings are irregular. Their costs also recur every year. Before introducing or expanding them, state governments should set out who will qualify, what the payments are meant to achieve and how the state will finance them if revenue growth slows. The same scrutiny should apply to existing subsidies, including those that are hard to justify on distributional grounds.

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Centre is shifting more employment costs to states

The 16th Finance Commission retained the states’ collective share of the divisible pool of central taxes at 41%. In dividing that share among states, it gave contribution to national GDP a 10% weight, while differences in per capita income remain the largest factor. The formula gives more recognition to the size of a state’s economy. Its adequacy will also depend on whether states with weaker tax bases can still finance basic services and the infrastructure they need to attract investment.

Rural employment shows how decisions at the Centre can affect what states have left to spend. Under MGNREGA, the Centre paid the full cost of unskilled wages and 75% of material costs. Under its successor, VB-G RAM G, the Centre and most states share expenditure in a 60:40 ratio, with a 90:10 ratio for eligible north-eastern and Himalayan states. States also bear expenditure above their centrally determined allocations. PRS calculates that applying the new funding rules to the same volume and cost of work in 2025–26 would have raised the states’ bill from about ₹5,261 crore to around ₹33,000 crore. That comparison shows how much the change in funding rules alone could cost.

States can make more room by improving tax collection, reforming loss-making power utilities and reviewing subsidies that miss their intended beneficiaries. The Centre has a responsibility, too. When it changes the funding rules for a national programme, it should set out what each state will be expected to pay and how that bill could change if demand rises. A state cannot sensibly commit to a multi-year investment programme if its share of a national scheme’s costs can force it to postpone projects already under way.

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