In late July 2026, Indonesia’s Prabowo had finalised the draft of a Presidential Regulation (Perpres) on the government-led cooperatives established in tens of thousands of villages across the nation. The name is rooted in Indonesia’s national flag, the red and white. The Red‑White Village Cooperative so far operates only through Presidential Instructions, a low‑level executive directive. Framed as vital to the food security supply chain, the village cooperatives are introduced without a legal framework. Its issue lies in Prabowo’s extra-legal power.
Prabowo’s reliance on this approach illustrates the next stage in Indonesia’s trajectory of autocratic legality. In previous administration, President Joko Widodo typically changed the law before taking action. President Prabowo has increasingly relied on an extra-legal or “act first, law later” approach.
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Prabowo’s extra-legal power
Underpinning Prabowo’s flagship initiatives, extra-legal power becomes his autocratic innovation outside formal mechanisms. Exercised as a ‘prerogative right’ whenever the executive deems it necessary, the approach portrays Widodo’s aggrandisement of presidential power. For example, the introduction of the village cooperatives through Presidential Instruction indicates that the President seeks to remain politically unchecked. It extends Widodo’s approach, whose National Strategic Project was introduced through a Presidential Regulation in 2016 characterised as coercive. Given that both bypass Parliament’s legislative function, these approaches circumvent constitutional procedures and have far-reaching implications for deepening democratic decline.
This initiative was introduced after President Prabowo publicly instructed his subordinates, in a series of fiery and outspoken speeches to establish village cooperatives. Even without underpinning regulations in place, military battalions were deployed to address on-the-ground requirements, such as securing land and coordinating construction logistics for the village cooperatives. Hence, both military mobilisation and the broader initiative reflect the “act first, law later” approach. It allows the village cooperatives to operate not under law but orders, making obedience solely subject to Prabowo because he is the President. While the Presidential Regulation may eventually be enacted, the practice will remain extra-legal, as such obedience through this instrument rests on power concentrated in the President.
Another critical aspect of village cooperatives is its top-down nature, which is at odds with the organic, grass roots character of cooperatives. Officials in village governments may experience coercive consent despite the absence of any prior business rationale or plan. It is no coincidence, then, that constant pressure to expedite its implementation sidelines the varying capacities, spatial challenges, and economic realities present in the village.
The imposition of uniform structures, functions, and targets across all village cooperatives is further directed from Jakarta. Such a state-sponsored model distinguishes village cooperatives from conventional cooperatives. Thus, it polarises the term ‘cooperative’ between village cooperatives as the state-sponsored one and those that commonly exist as small- and medium-sized village businesses.
Land acquisition through extra-economic coercion
To establish village cooperatives, they require local resources, specifically a plot of land, to serve as the project site. However, in many instances, land scarcity has created additional obstacles. Recent cases reveal that this project has been built in unconventional locations, such as near cemeteries, in mountainous terrain, or in non-residential areas.
Land is critical to village cooperatives as they are established on the villages’ land (often referred to as ‘tanah kas desa’). The structural tension arises from competing claims over access to this land, which initially serves as an economic resource contributing to the village’s own-resource revenue for local development and well-being.
Its procurement is characterised by extra-economic coercion, with Jakarta pressuring village governments to allocate their land for the village cooperatives. In Indonesia and elsewhere, such coercion involving the military in land deals often results in land dispossession that extends beyond legal and political pressures.
Yet village officials are pressured to comply with a presidential instruction, even though doing so may expose them to criminal liability for violating land‑use laws.
A further complexity arises from the legal conflict between village cooperatives and regulations that designate protected land and spatial plans. For instance, 87 of 238 villages in Batang Regency had land designated as protected. Likewise, 60 percent of village cooperatives sites in Sragen were reportedly located on protected land.
These examples reveal a contradiction between the government’s existing commitment to protecting land for food security and its allocation for the project, despite laws prohibiting such conversion. This contradiction inevitably extends to spatial plans, which designate the same land in the green zone as protected for agricultural uses. It portrays a broader pattern across Southeast Asia, where scholars suggest that inconsistent state initiatives often result in overlapping land allocations, thereby facilitating dispossession.
This dynamic places village cooperatives within the President’s extra-legal power, leaving local authorities unable to resist Jakarta’s demands to release protected land. Yet, compliance with Presidential Instruction creates another contradiction. It may result in criminal liability for village government officials vested with legal rights over land for converting land previously designated protected for food security.
By contrast, because village cooperative is neither classified as a public interest nor a national strategic project, Prabowo cannot rely on the Job Creation Law. Thus, releasing protected land for village cooperatives even with replacement land is unlawful.
The village cooperatives are more than a development program. They are a window into Indonesia’s evolving political trajectory, where personalised presidential authority, military mobilisation and extra-legal instruments increasingly shape national policy. The initiative’s patriotic branding, spiritualised origin story and rapid deployment illustrate how executive power can expand outside formal legal channels. As Indonesia moves deeper into this new phase, the challenge will be ensuring that governance remains anchored in constitutional procedures rather than presidential prerogative.
Muhammad Bahrul Ulum is a PhD student at the School of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Australia and an assistant professor at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Brawijaya, Indonesia. He writes on human rights law and development, land governance, as well as food politics. Syahriza Alkohir Anggoro is an assistant professor at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Brawijaya, Indonesia. His research lies at the intersection of human rights, environmental law, and legal history. Torik Abdul Aziz Wibowo is an assistant professor at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Brawijaya, Indonesia. His research focuses on constitutional law and politics of lawmaking. Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info
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