CCI commitment regulations: India introduced commitment proceedings to resolve competition cases faster and correct market distortions before an investigation runs its full course. Two years after the framework took effect, however, only Google and InterGlobe Aviation, which operates IndiGo, are publicly known to have filed commitment applications. Neither had resulted in a published final commitment order by early September 2026.
The Competition Commission of India has responded by giving applicants and itself more time. Its Commitment Amendment Regulations, notified on August 18, extend several deadlines and make it easier to correct a defective application. These are useful changes. Yet the limited use of the mechanism may have less to do with time than with the legal risks an applicant assumes when it chooses this route.
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CCI commitment rules remain largely untested
The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 inserted Sections 48A and 48B into the Competition Act, 2002. They created separate settlement and commitment procedures for inquiries involving vertical restraints under Section 3(4) or abuse of dominance under Section 4.
The distinction is important. A commitment may be offered after the CCI has formed a prima facie view and ordered an investigation under Section 26(1), but before the enterprise receives the Director General’s report. A settlement application comes later, after that report has been received but before the Commission passes its final order.
A commitment therefore allows an enterprise to propose changes in conduct before the investigation produces a finding of infringement. If the CCI accepts the proposal, it can make the commitments binding without recording a contravention.
The 2024 Commitment Regulations require the Commission to consider the nature and duration of the alleged conduct, the effectiveness and enforceability of the proposed remedy, its effect on market contestability and the applicant’s compliance history. The CCI may also seek objections and suggestions from the informant, the Director General and other interested parties.
Google used this route in the case brought by WinZO Games over access to the Play Store for real-money gaming applications. IndiGo subsequently filed an application after the CCI ordered an investigation into allegations arising from its flight disruptions in December 2025. The Commission invited public comments on IndiGo’s proposal in July 2026.
These are commitment applications, not settlements. More significantly, two applications are too slender a record from which to conclude that the regime has failed. They are enough, however, to ask whether its incentives have been designed well.
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Longer timelines ease procedural pressure
The 2026 amendment gives an enterprise 60 days, instead of 45, to submit an application after receiving a Section 26(1) order. The CCI’s initial processing period rises from seven to 15 working days, while the time allowed for completing commitment proceedings increases from 130 to 180 working days.
An incomplete application will now be returned with the defects identified. The applicant has ten working days to correct and refile it, and the fee already paid will be adjusted against the fee due on refiling. Earlier, applicants faced the risk that an application with uncured defects would be treated as invalid.
These changes address complaints raised by practitioners since the regulations came into force in March 2024. Preparing a credible remedy can require extensive consultations within a company and with the regulator. Sixty days is more realistic than 45, particularly in digital-market cases involving several products and business units.
The extension of the overall process to 180 working days is harder to reconcile with the original promise of early market correction. The amended Regulation 4(7) also excludes from this period any time taken by the applicant or another party to provide information, clarification or a response. That exclusion may be justified when delay is caused by the applicant. Applying it to any other party gives the proceeding a deadline whose actual end date may be difficult to predict.
The CCI should disclose how much time has been excluded in each case and why. Without such reporting, a 180-day limit could become nominal.
The larger deterrents lie outside the calendar
Filing fees range from Rs 2.5 lakh for enterprises with annual Indian turnover of up to Rs 50 crore to Rs 50 lakh for those with turnover above Rs 500 crore. A Rs 50 lakh non-refundable fee is substantial, although it may still be modest compared with the cost and duration of a contested competition proceeding. The fee by itself is unlikely to explain the low uptake among large enterprises.
The absence of a statutory appeal is more consequential. Section 48B(7) says that no appeal under Section 53B may be filed against an order on a commitment application. Section 53B is the provision under which CCI orders are ordinarily challenged before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. The prescribed application also requires an applicant to waive legal proceedings concerning issues covered by a commitment order.
Judicial review before a constitutional court cannot be contractually eliminated, but it is an exceptional remedy rather than an ordinary merits appeal. An enterprise must therefore weigh the value of ending an investigation against the possibility of accepting an onerous remedy with little scope for appellate correction.
The treatment of admissions also deserves attention. The regulations provide safeguards for information supplied during commitment proceedings, but they do not give an applicant comprehensive immunity from the consequences of facts already admitted or established in another Indian or foreign proceeding concerning the same cause of action. For multinational businesses facing parallel investigations, that risk can influence the decision to cooperate.
These provisions reflect a legitimate regulatory concern. A company should not be allowed to secure a negotiated resolution and then reopen the same dispute through prolonged litigation. Yet finality should follow a fair and predictable procedure. A limited review confined to jurisdiction, procedural fairness and whether the remedy exceeds the competition concerns identified by the CCI would preserve finality without leaving the Commission’s discretion largely unchecked.
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Europe offers both a model and a warning
Article 9 of the European Union’s Regulation 1/2003 allows the European Commission to make voluntary commitments binding without finding an infringement. The procedure became a major part of EU antitrust enforcement. Academic estimates suggest that more than 90% of non-cartel cases decided between 2008 and early 2013 were resolved through commitments.
Its popularity also exposed a weakness. In the 2010 Alrosa judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that proportionality operates differently in commitment cases because the undertaking has offered the remedy voluntarily. The Commission need not establish that the commitments are the least onerous means of addressing its concerns in the way it might have to justify an imposed remedy.
That gives the regulator considerable bargaining power. A company seeking to escape a long investigation may accept obligations that go beyond what could have been imposed after a contested finding. Europe’s experience shows why speedy resolution must be accompanied by procedural safeguards and credible supervision.
Monitoring is particularly important. Regulation 9 allows the CCI to appoint an agency to oversee implementation, but leaves the decision to its discretion. Some commitments, especially those governing algorithms, platform access or discriminatory commercial terms, cannot be verified reliably through company reports alone.
The United Kingdom has made greater use of independent monitoring in competition cases. Its competition authority required such a trustee when it accepted Amazon’s Marketplace commitments. British law also allows monetary penalties for breaches of competition remedy requirements, while the regulator retains the ability to resume an investigation.
India’s Section 48C permits the CCI to revoke a commitment order if the applicant fails to comply, withholds material information or if the facts materially change. The Commission may restore the original inquiry and recover legal costs of up to Rs 1 crore. This is a useful sanction, but reviving a lengthy investigation after a remedy has failed may not correct the market promptly.
The CCI should require independent monitoring wherever compliance cannot be verified from objective market data. Parliament should also consider a proportionate monetary penalty for breach of a commitment order. Such a penalty would sit between passive monitoring and the drastic step of revocation.
The 2026 amendment improves the mechanics of filing. It does not settle the questions that will determine whether enterprises use the mechanism: how far disclosures are protected, how remedies can be reviewed and how compliance will be enforced. Commitment proceedings save time only when companies trust the procedure and the regulator can ensure that promised changes reach the market. Extending the clock cannot supply either condition.
Arnav Srivastava is a Research Assistant at CUTS Institute for Regulation and Competition (CIRC). Deesha Sarmah is a Law Graduate from Amity Law School.