Fertility decline: India’s demographic story has turned. While the old fear was population explosion, the new problem is uneven population decline. The latest Sample Registration System data put India’s total fertility rate at 1.9, below the replacement level of 2.1. This is not a passing dip. India has stayed below replacement fertility, confirming that the transition is now entrenched. The 2024 SRS data also show smaller family formation, with first-born children accounting for 66.4% of live births and higher-order births shrinking sharply.
The national number hides the real story. Fertility has fallen sharply across southern and western India. Kerala and Tamil Nadu are already close to levels seen in ageing advanced economies. Karnataka and Maharashtra are not far behind. Delhi has also recorded very low fertility. Bihar and Uttar Pradesh remain above replacement level, though both have seen decline. They still retain a younger demographic profile.
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India fertility decline and the north-south divide
This divide is no longer merely demographic. It has become political and fiscal.
States that invested earlier in public health, women’s education, family planning and social development now face ageing populations and slower labour force growth. States with higher fertility will account for a larger share of India’s young population. The consequences are already visible in debates over delimitation, tax devolution, welfare allocations and representation in national institutions.
The immediate anxiety is delimitation. Parliamentary seats have remained frozen for decades so that states which controlled population growth were not punished for doing so. That freeze is expected to be revisited after the first Census conducted after 2026. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar could gain political weight. Southern states fear a relative loss of voice despite stronger economic and governance records.
This is not a technical issue. It goes to the design of Indian federalism. A democracy must represent people. But a union of states cannot ignore the incentives created by representation rules. Penalising states for achieving lower fertility would be bad politics and worse public policy.
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Premature demographic transition in India
India’s fertility decline has occurred under conditions unlike those in Europe or East Asia. Advanced economies usually became rich, urban and institutionally prepared before entering low-fertility phases. India has not.
Tamil Nadu and Kerala reached demographic stabilisation long before attaining the income levels associated with similar transitions in developed countries. Their problem is not fertility decline itself. It is fertility decline before adequate pension coverage, geriatric care, urban infrastructure and health systems are in place.
This is the essence of premature demographic transition. Low fertility has arrived before fiscal capacity. Japan and Norway entered ageing after accumulating large economic surpluses and welfare systems. Indian states are ageing while still dealing with patchy healthcare, informal employment and weak social security.
India’s demographic dividend is also uneven. The country may remain young in aggregate, but that youth will not be evenly distributed. Southern states could face labour shortages and rising old-age dependency. Northern states will continue to send large numbers into the working-age population.
Migration and India fertility decline
Internal migration will therefore become more central to growth. Workers from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan will move in larger numbers to southern and western states. Construction, manufacturing, domestic work, healthcare and services will depend on them.
This is not a distant prospect. It is already visible in Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Chennai, Kochi and Mumbai. The issue is whether receiving states build institutions for migrant integration or treat migration as a temporary inconvenience. Labour mobility can soften demographic imbalance. It can also sharpen social tension if housing, schooling, language policy and welfare portability are neglected.
High fertility in parts of India reflects gaps in social development. Fertility is closely linked to women’s education, healthcare access, infant mortality, age at marriage and female workforce participation. Bihar’s fertility remains high because these indicators remain weak. Uttar Pradesh has reduced fertility, but its population base means even moderate fertility produces large absolute additions.
The SRS data also show that smaller families are becoming normal. Young couples are delaying marriage and childbirth. Metropolitan India has already moved towards one-child or two-child families. But smaller families also make son preference more consequential. India’s sex ratio at birth has improved to 918 girls per 1,000 boys during 2022-24, but remains below the natural range. Fertility decline is a welfare gain only if it is not accompanied by gender-biased birth outcomes.
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India is still not East Asia. South Korea’s fertility rate remains below 1.0 despite a recent rise, while Japan’s fertility rate fell to a record low in 2024. India is far from those extremes.
The policy question is therefore not whether India must panic. It should not. The question is whether low-fertility states prepare for ageing before the burden arrives. Pension systems, primary healthcare, chronic disease management, long-term care, assisted living, urban transport and social security for informal workers must adjust.
Fertility decline and fiscal federalism
Fiscal federalism will become more contentious. Southern states argue that they are disadvantaged because population remains important in tax devolution. Their fear is simple. They may be penalised twice: first through possible loss of political weight, and then through lower fiscal shares relative to high-population states.
Finance Commission formulas have tried to balance population with performance. The Fifteenth Finance Commission used 2011 population with a 15% weight and demographic performance with a 12.5% weight. It did so to reward states that controlled fertility. The Sixteenth Finance Commission has retained 2011 population, raised its weight to 17.5%, and redefined demographic performance to reward lower population growth between 1971 and 2011.
That balance will be harder to sustain as demographic gaps widen. A formula that ignores population will lack political legitimacy. A formula that ignores demographic performance will punish success.
The demographic transition is a major developmental achievement. Fertility decline reflects better maternal health, lower infant mortality, wider education, greater contraceptive access and changing aspirations. Unlike the coercive family planning of the Emergency era, the recent decline has been largely voluntary.
The challenge now is to manage success. India is no longer one demographic country. Some states resemble ageing middle-income societies. Others remain young developing economies. The task is to design federal, fiscal and labour-market institutions that can hold both realities together.