The India-EU and India-US trade agreement have been politically concluded, but there is still work to do in legally scrubbing and ratifying these. And the methods with which they get operationalised tell us a lot about various political systems.
The first question is, in the EU-India trade agreement why does India not have to involve the Parliament and EU has to? And the answer is interesting. The first thing to understand is that these agreements, in the eyes of the international laws, are treaties.
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Trade deal ratification: Why EU parliament matters
As per the Vienna convention, any written agreement between subjects of international law, governed by international law, is a treaty — regardless of what it is called (treaty, agreement, convention, protocol). However, India has a different treatment of treaties, per se. While they bind the country internationally, they do not automatically become domestic law.
So, a treaty has no legal effect inside the country unless Parliament enacts or modifies a law. Therefore, the executive can sign and ratify the agreement, but the parliament has to step in only if domestic law must change or if the trade agreement impacts domestic laws. Under Article 73 of the Constitution of India, the executive power of the Union extends to matters on which Parliament can legislate.
On the other hand, under the EU’s constitutional framework, international agreements are concluded under Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and, once ratified, they become part of the EU legal order. The major question here should be – that what is the practical value of this? To understand that, let us take the example of an Indian cotton shirt.
Suppose the EU–India trade agreement allows Indian cotton shirts to enter Europe without paying import duty. That shirt might arrive first in Germany, France, Italy, or Spain. Whichever country it enters through must apply exactly the same checks. Customs officers must agree on what counts as an Indian-origin shirt, what documents prove this, and whether the shirt qualifies for zero duty.
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If one country applies softer checks than another, importers will simply route all shipments through the easiest entry point and then sell the goods across Europe. Since there are no customs borders inside the EU, weaker enforcement in one country automatically affects all others. This is why the EU has to adjust its internal systems when it signs a trade agreement. Customs authorities across all member states need the same procedures, the same software systems, the same training, and the same interpretation of the rules. Food inspectors, product safety regulators, and port authorities all have to work in sync.
Now compare this with India. When a European car or machine enters India under a trade agreement, it passes through Indian customs at a port such as Mumbai or Chennai. Once cleared, it can move anywhere in the country. There is only one customs authority. If there is a problem or inconsistency, the central government can correct it directly through instructions or notifications. There is no risk that different states will undermine each other at the border.
The same logic applies to food and safety standards. If Indian mangoes enter Europe, inspectors in different EU countries must apply identical checks. If one country is lax, all of Europe becomes vulnerable because goods can move freely across borders. In India, food safety standards at the international border are centrally controlled. States do not independently decide how foreign food products enter the country. Therefore, it is the multiplicity of enforcement institutions that require greater coordination in Europe and need a massive consensus building exercise that is legally coded and concluded.
India-US deal: A difference in political philosophies
Again there is a slight difference in the case of the United States. First, there is no comprehensive India–US FTA and what exists are sectoral, limited, or proposed arrangements (e.g., market access packages, digital trade understandings, critical minerals, or an “early harvest” deal.
Having established that, one cannot overlook the fact that both the US and India are single sovereign states with one external border. In both systems, customs is handled by a national authority. Yet, in the US, eventually, the Congress needs to approve any major trade deal, unlike in India where the role of the Parliament doesn’t really arise.
The legal reason is that according to Article I of the US Constitution, the power to regulate trade with foreign countries belongs to Congress. Even though the President negotiates trade deals, the legal power to change trade policy sits with the legislature. Customs officials could not apply new tariff rates, and agencies could not enforce new trade rules unless Congress passed legislation to implement them.
In practice, this means that no serious trade agreement can function without congressional approval. This is why the US developed mechanisms such as Trade Promotion Authority. Congress temporarily authorises the President to negotiate trade agreements within defined objectives, and in return Congress agrees to hold an up-or-down vote on the final deal without amendments.
So, why this difference between the Indian and US approval mechanisms? The deeper reason is good-old political philosophy. The US was built on a strong separation of powers and a fear of executive overreach – similar fears also drives the gun agenda (but that is a topic for later).
Trade policy affects taxes, prices, and industries across the country, so the Constitution deliberately placed it in the hands of elected representatives rather than the executive alone. India’s method of handling trade agreements reflects a political philosophy that places executive discretion and to some extent, developmental pragmatism.
At its core, India’s approach reflects a trust in the executive as the primary agent of national interest in external affairs. Foreign policy and trade are seen as domains that require speed, confidentiality, and strategic judgment rather than continuous legislative bargaining. This comes from the post-independence view that a strong central executive was necessary to hold together a large, poor, and newly unified country.
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Why did we debate the 2008 nuclear deal in Parliament?
The final question that emerges to an Indian political observer is that why did we then have to debate the nuclear deal in the parliament in 2008? The short answer is, legally there was no major need from the perspective of the executive having the power to sign international treaties. However, that was a coalition government. On July 18, 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President George W. Bush issued a joint statement announcing the broad framework of civil nuclear cooperation.
By 2006 and 2007, the details of the deal became clearer. India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and place the civilian ones under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. This raised fears among opposition parties and coalition partners that India’s strategic autonomy was being compromised. The left parties, which were supporting the United Progressive Alliance government from outside, withdrew their support over the nuclear deal. As a result, the government was forced to seek a vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha on July 22, 2008.
The parliamentary debate happened because the survival of the government was at stake and not because there was a major legal hurdle. At the same time, parts of the deal required domestic follow-through. India needed to negotiate safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which it did in August 2008, and later align domestic nuclear liability and regulatory arrangements.
While the executive could sign international agreements, it could not politically implement such a far-reaching shift without parliamentary backing and legislative cooperation. Yet, the major concern was political.
Seen together, these differences show that treaties may look similar on paper, but the paths they travel inside countries reveal how power, political philosophy, and governance are fundamentally organised.