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India’s nuclear power ambitions confront the limits of execution

nuclear power reactor

India needs licensed nuclear power reactor designs, firm orders and credible costs to turn its 100 GW target into generating capacity.

India’s aspiration to become a developed country by 2047 will require far more electricity than the country produces today. Peak demand reached 270 GW in May 2026 and is projected to rise to about 708 GW by 2047. Electricity’s share in final energy consumption must also increase as transport, industrial processes and household cooking shift away from fossil fuels.

Solar and wind will supply much of the additional power. They cannot, on their own, meet demand at all hours. Storage, stronger transmission networks and generating capacity that can operate independently of the weather will be needed. Nuclear power belongs in that mix.

The Union government has set a target of at least 100 GW of nuclear power capacity by 2047. India now has 8.8 GW, accounting for about 3 per cent of electricity generation. Closing this gap in two decades will require faster construction of conventional reactors, development of small modular reactors and progress on India’s long-delayed thorium programme.

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India’s nuclear power target

Coal generates nearly three-quarters of India’s electricity. Replacing a substantial part of it while meeting rising demand will test every low-carbon technology available.

Nuclear power plants operate at high capacity factors and provide large volumes of power from relatively small sites. They can support a grid carrying increasing amounts of variable solar and wind power. Uranium imports also expose India to less price volatility than imported oil, gas or coal because fuel accounts for a smaller share of nuclear generation costs and can be stockpiled.

India’s nuclear programme was designed around its resource constraints. The first stage uses pressurised heavy water reactors fuelled by natural uranium. Fast breeder reactors form the second stage, producing fissile material for eventual use in thorium reactors. The third stage is intended to exploit the country’s large thorium deposits.

Progress has been slow. Conventional nuclear plants take years to clear, finance and build. The prototype fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam has suffered repeated delays. Commercial use of thorium remains distant. The 100 GW target therefore needs an additional route.

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Small modular nuclear reactors

Small modular reactors generally have a capacity of up to 300 MW per unit. Their components are intended to be manufactured in factories, transported to the site and assembled in modules. This could shorten construction schedules and reduce the financial exposure attached to a single large reactor.

SMRs may also suit industrial sites, smaller electricity grids and locations where land or cooling water limits the use of large plants. Coal-based generating stations could, in some cases, be repurposed by installing an SMR while retaining their transmission connections and other infrastructure.

These advantages remain largely prospective. Factory production lowers costs only when manufacturers receive enough orders to build a series of standardised reactors. The first units are likely to be expensive. Each design must still meet nuclear safety requirements, while components must withstand standards far more exacting than those used in conventional power equipment.

India has yet to take an indigenous SMR through licensing and construction. Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd are working on designs based on the country’s experience with pressurised heavy water reactors. That provides an engineering base, though it does not settle questions of cost, licensing or serial manufacture.

The Union Budget for 2025-26 allocated ₹20,000 crore to a Nuclear Energy Mission for SMR research and development. It set a goal of putting at least five indigenous SMRs into operation by 2033. Seven years is a demanding schedule for design approval, site clearance, financing and construction.

The government should first select a small number of designs and fund their development through clearly defined stages. Spreading the allocation across many reactor concepts would delay each of them. Public funding should cover early design work, testing and the first demonstration units. Subsequent support must depend on technical milestones and disclosed cost estimates.

Manufacturing policy must follow reactor selection. Heavy engineering companies will invest in specialised facilities only if they can see an order pipeline. India should identify components that can be made domestically from the first unit and those that will initially require imports. Local-content targets imposed before designs are settled would raise costs and delay deployment.

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Thorium remains a long-term option for India

India’s uranium deposits are modest in relation to the proposed expansion of nuclear power. Domestic ore is often of low grade, making extraction expensive. India consequently imports uranium from Kazakhstan, Canada and Uzbekistan, among other suppliers.

Thorium is more abundant in India, particularly in monazite sands along the southern and eastern coasts. Its abundance, however, does not make it ready reactor fuel. Thorium-232 must first absorb a neutron and be converted into uranium-233, which can then sustain fission.

That process creates difficult engineering problems. Irradiated thorium fuel must be reprocessed remotely because of intense gamma radiation from associated isotopes. Fuel fabrication needs heavy shielding. Some proposed thorium fuel cycles also involve corrosive chemicals that require specialised equipment.

India has established that the cycle is technically possible. The 30-kilowatt KAMINI research reactor at Kalpakkam uses uranium-233 recovered from irradiated thorium. It does not generate commercial electricity. The proposed Advanced Heavy Water Reactor is intended to demonstrate greater use of thorium and advanced safety systems, but it has not entered construction.

Thorium cannot supply a large share of India’s electricity by 2047. It can reduce long-term dependence on imported uranium if the Department of Atomic Energy completes the intermediate steps: fast breeder operation, fuel reprocessing, remote fabrication and demonstration of a commercially relevant reactor.

Research funding should therefore be protected from pressure to claim premature deployment. The test is whether India can run the entire thorium fuel cycle safely and at an acceptable cost.

SHANTI Act opens nuclear power to private capital

The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act, 2025 received presidential assent on December 21, 2025. It replaced the earlier legal structure that had confined commercial nuclear generation largely to government-owned entities.

The SHANTI Act allows licensed private entities to set up nuclear facilities, subject to central government approval and safety authorisation by the regulator. Strategic materials, spent fuel and sensitive activities remain under government control.

Private participation can bring capital, project management and manufacturing capacity. It will not solve the economics of nuclear power by itself. Investors need rules on liability, tariffs, fuel supply, waste management and decommissioning. Lenders will also demand clarity on who bears the cost of construction delays and changes ordered by the regulator.

Foreign investment faces an additional gap. The Act permits foreign participation under regulated conditions, but the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade and the Reserve Bank of India must translate that opening into detailed investment rules. Until they do, reactor vendors and overseas investors cannot assess the terms of entry.

The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board will need a licensing system suited to modular reactors. Applying every procedure designed for a large conventional plant may erase the time and cost advantages claimed for SMRs. Safety standards cannot be diluted, but licensing can recognise standardised designs and repeated factory production.

Regulatory independence will carry greater weight once private operators enter the sector. The same government that wants faster nuclear power capacity addition cannot be seen to control safety decisions. The regulator must have its own technical staff, budget and authority to publish decisions.

A workable manufacturing programme

India has accumulated experience in nuclear power reactor design, construction, fuel fabrication and plant operation. That puts it ahead of countries entering nuclear generation for the first time. Yet experience with public-sector projects does not automatically produce an industry capable of manufacturing standardised reactors in series.

The next phase should concentrate on measures tied to identified projects:

A separate nuclear manufacturing programme under Make in India would be useful only if it is built around approved reactor designs and firm orders. A mission without projects would produce committees, vendor lists and little capacity.

The government’s 100 GW target implies adding more than 90 GW in about two decades. Five demonstration SMRs by 2033 would account for only a fraction of that requirement. Conventional reactors, including the fleet-mode 700 MW pressurised heavy water reactors, will still carry most of the expansion during the next decade.

SMRs could contribute after their costs and operating performance have been demonstrated. Thorium has a longer horizon. The immediate task is to turn the 2025 legal changes and budget allocation into licensed designs, construction sites and accountable project schedules.

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