Sheikh Hasina death sentence and India’s dilemma: Exile has always carried its own irony. Around the world, political leaders flee across borders in the hope of safety, only to learn that refuge is just another stage where old battles continue. Some find themselves protected by countries they once distrusted. Others discover that allies grow uncomfortable when an exile becomes too heavy a burden. Sheikh Hasina now occupies that uneasy space. From Delhi, she watched her trial advance in Dhaka, knowing well that the irony of her situation is almost dramatic – the tribunal she created has now sentenced her to death.
The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) in Dhaka handed down the sentence for her alleged role in the July–August 2024 student uprising, a period when security forces shot unarmed protesters, used helicopters and drones, and left an estimated 1,400 people dead, according to the assessments. Her former home minister received the same penalty, while former police chief was given five years in prison. The tribunal concluded that Hasina bore clear “command responsibility,” citing videos of shootings, helicopter fire, and audio clips of instructions issued by senior officials. Bangladesh’s Daily Star described the Sheikh Hasina death sentence as “inevitable,” given the documented evidence presented before the court.
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Sheikh Hasina death sentence and political upheaval
What makes the moment extraordinary is the reversal of roles. The ICT was Hasina’s own creation in 2009, designed to prosecute those responsible for the 1971 war crimes. Jamaat-e-Islami leaders convicted of collaborating with the Pakistan Army during the genocide were among its most high-profile targets. When Jamaat’s leaders were executed, the party dismissed the tribunal as biased and politically motivated. Today, the same Jamaat leaders applaud the death sentence against Hasina, with Mia Golam Parwar triumphantly declaring that “there is no scope to question” the tribunal’s judgment. The contradiction reveals how Bangladesh’s political forces twist institutions to fit the moment.
Concerns about due process have come from both inside and outside the country. Amnesty International criticised the speed of the proceedings, the refusal to assign Hasina legal representation, and the interim government’s administrative amendment of the ICT Act, which opened the door for her prosecution. Critics argue that justice delivered in this manner amounts to political revenge rather than accountability.
Sheikh Hasina death sentence now puts India in a difficult position. For more than a decade, she was New Delhi’s most reliable political partner in the neighbourhood, offering cooperation on counter-terrorism, transit, connectivity, and border management. But today India hosts her as a political refugee at a moment when Dhaka’s interim government (which is sensitive to domestic anger and influenced by Islamist groups) demands a tough line against her.
India has already indicated that it is unlikely to extradite her, citing concerns over the fairness of the trial. However, keeping her in Delhi carries political costs. Any move India makes will affect its delicate relationship with the interim government and impact the diplomatic setting ahead of Bangladesh’s elections next year. An analyst noted, Hasina might still be India’s special guest, but she would soon become a burden.
The crisis, however, lies within Bangladesh’s political change since Hasina’s fall. The student uprising that triggered her removal created a vacuum that Islamist groups rushed to fill. The Yunus-led government lifted the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir. Hizb-ut-Tahrir resurfaced in the streets with calls for a caliphate. Teachers and students marched with ISIS-like flags, indicating how radical ideas have invaded spaces once associated with secular nationalism.
Bangladesh political crisis 2025
Jamaat’s return is particularly significant because it never disappeared, and it merely retreated and reorganised. Its vast economic empire (secured by the Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd) remained intact throughout Hasina’s crackdown. Through a network of banks, charities, madrasas, and business associations, Jamaat maintained a presence that reached deep into rural Bangladesh. Reports show that Jamaat recorded the highest financial income among all registered political parties, and between 2007 and 2018, 620 million taka in foreign donations entered the accounts of organisations linked to Jamaat, some of it allegedly used to support extremist mobilisation.
What has changed today is Jamaat’s reinstated legitimacy. The Supreme Court restored its political registration, clearing the party to contest elections next year. Its leaders quickly held massive rallies in Dhaka, implying confidence and renewed ambition. The ideological tone of the interim government, its personnel choices, and its administrative leniency towards banned groups suggest a close alignment taking shape.
India–Bangladesh relations at risk amid China–Pakistan tilt
This shift is taking place alongside Bangladesh’s slow but visible tilt toward Pakistan and China. Yunus’s meetings with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Asim Munir led to expanded military cooperation, easier visa rules, and increased trade. Pakistan’s ISI, which historically used Jamaat and Shibir as political and logistical assets, appears once again active in Bangladesh’s domestic scene, especially in the Rohingya camps.
China’s interest is equally strategic. When Jamaat leaders met a delegation of Chinese Communist Party officials, they floated the provocative idea of an “independent Rohingya state” – a proposal that threatens India’s major projects in Myanmar, including the Sittwe Port and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit corridor. The meeting hinted at the emergence of a new political geometry in South Asia’s eastern flank.
The interim government’s internal agenda is just as unsettling. The Constitutional Reform Commission has proposed removing secularism, nationalism, and socialism from the Constitution – three principles that have defined Bangladesh’s political identity since 1972. At the same time, attacks on Hindus, Ahmadis, and Sufi shrines are rising sharply.
The spread of new versions of Salafi-Wahhabi ideology has begun to reshape public spaces and school environments. The release of militants from organisations like Ansarullah Bangla Team, and the return of groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, show a government willing to accommodate forces that were once seen as existential threats to the nation’s secular character.
The reaction to Sheikh Hasina death sentence shows this polarisation. Some young Bangladeshis who lost friends in the protests believe the verdict brings closure. Others see it as political vendetta disguised as justice. Exiled author Taslima Nasreen described the trial as “a farce in the name of justice,” accusing Muhammad Yunus and what she called his “jihadi forces” of committing similar abuses during the unrest. The Bangladeshi press is split down the middle, reflecting the society it serves.
For India, these developments carry far-reaching consequences. The rise of Jamaat and other Islamist groups will directly affect India’s security outlook, especially along the Northeast border, where cross-border militant movements have historically been active. Dhaka’s growing closeness to Islamabad raises concerns about intelligence cooperation, radicalisation, and the potential use of Bangladesh as a staging ground for Pakistan-backed networks. China’s involvement may also put another dimension of strategic risk, especially with the Rohingya crisis near India’s eastern frontier.
India also faces immediate policy challenges. The Ganga Water Treaty expires next year, and negotiating its renewal with an interim government influenced by anti-India forces will be far more difficult than dealing with Hasina’s administration. Connectivity and transit routes through Bangladesh (vital for India’s access to the Northeast) may face new obstacles if Dhaka’s political establishment continues drifting away from India.
Ironically, economic ties between the two countries remained strong. Bangladesh’s exports to India rose from $1.57 billion to $1.76 billion this year, a 12.4% increase. Exports in July 2025 reached $149.4 million, 4% more than the previous year. India supplied $9 billion in goods to Bangladesh, including machinery, chemicals, and fuel. These numbers reflect deep structural interdependence, but as history often shows, politics can overturn economics.
The Sheikh Hasina death sentence is not merely a legal outcome but a sign of the country’s ideological shift. A political system that once attached to secular nationalism is now being challenged by Islamist mobilisation, Pakistan-China engagement, and a judiciary acting in ways that symbolise political expediency.
For India, the challenge is not just how to respond to the verdict or manage Hasina’s exile. It is how to deal with a neighbour whose political identity is transforming in ways that could upset the region’s balance.