The world is not one in which India can safely adopt the posture of a passive bystander. The second Trump presidency is reshaping global norms — undermining alliances, weaponising interdependence, and deploying coercive diplomacy — while China is deepening its expansive reach into global markets and critical supply chains. In this contest between two superpowers, India must recalibrate its foreign policy. The only viable path is a refreshed non-alignment 2.0 — a strategy of strategic autonomy, flexible engagement, and collective buffers — rather than subservience to either axis.
The concept of strategic autonomy once seemed archaic in a liberal order dominated by the United States. But that order is fraying. During the post–Cold War era, Eurasia’s middle powers thrived under a rules-based order, able to enjoy voice and agency without being forced into alignment. Today, great-power confrontation is squeezing that space: nations are pressured to choose between security guarantees under the US or dependency under China. The result is increasing binary bloc dynamics.
Vietnam’s resolve — choosing “no side” even as it endures Chinese maritime assertiveness — exemplifies this squeeze. Countries like South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam are diversifying economically, building diplomatic hedges, and employing multilateral diplomacy to resist coercion. In such a world, the only stable space is the middle ground. Non-alignment 2.0 posits that India should reclaim that terrain before it is lost.
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Non-alignment 2.0 and India’s imperatives
The term non-alignment 2.0 was coined a decade ago to update India’s foreign policy for the twenty-first century. Rather than reject strategic partners outright, it advocates a posture of equidistance, calibrated partnerships, and freedom of manoeuvre. Under this rubric, India should avoid binding defence or security alliances that limit its freedom. The country should remain open to cooperation with both the US and China, so long as its core interests are not compromised. It should invest in regional leadership (e.g. in SAARC, BIMSTEC, IORA), in multilateral institutions, and in Global South coalitions.
This is not naïveté — it is realistic balancing. As critics have observed, however, non-alignment 2.0 can be caricatured as “defensible duplicity” when deployed without consistency or realism. The real test is in calibrating policies so that non-alignment does not devolve into passivity or vacillation.
Hedging strategy: Between dependence and vassalage
In a world where both superpowers weaponise interdependence, middle powers must hedge. Trump is converting alliances into vassalage, transforming interdependence into chokeholds. China too weaponises critical minerals, clean-energy supply chains, and infrastructure lending. To resist these pressures, India must adopt a hedging strategy — one that diversifies dependencies and binds both powers into its own stability.
In trade, India must move aggressively on China+1 and regional supply-chain realignment. Recent academic work shows that despite US pressure, global value chains are reorienting toward ASEAN and South Asia as alternative manufacturing hubs. India can become one such hub, but only if it avoids locking itself into exclusive corridors with either power.
In security, India can deepen cooperation with the US where interests align (e.g. technology, counterterrorism), while resisting demands that it become an automatic front in any US–China confrontation. Simultaneously, it must pursue defence self-reliance, capability development, and indigenous deterrence so as not to be a client state.
Diplomatically, India should act as a bridge-builder: in QUAD, in Indo-Pacific forums, in BRICS, in the Global South. It should anchor new multilateral coalitions — a coalition of independents — that preserve the sovereignty of smaller states. President Macron has recently floated a coalition of independents at the Shangri-La Dialogue, offering a model for countries seeking a third way.
Non-alignment 2.0 as Global South strategy
India is not alone. Across Africa, Latin America, and Asia, many states chafe at binary choice structures. Short-term alignment with either superpower offers limited benefit and risks the erosion of sovereignty. In Africa, countries are caught between tariffs, debt diplomacy, and coercive aid. Many are thus adopting active non-alignment, refusing to pick sides, and putting national interests first.
China itself is casting itself as a Global South partner. As noted in recent reporting, Chinese leadership is intensifying ties with developing countries to counter US protectionism. Yet such relations are asymmetric; many Global South states are wary of becoming captive markets. The only defence is collective coordination on standards, debt architecture, climate finance, and multilateral governance.
If India leads such a coalition — between African, Southeast Asian, Latin American states — it can reconstitute South-South diplomacy as a real counterweight rather than a rhetorical posture.
Key risks and mitigations
Adopting non-alignment 2.0 is not without risk. First, critics charge that it may dilute moral clarity — for instance, in issues like Ukraine, Gaza, human rights, or territorial aggression. India must maintain principled positions, even while keeping strategic freedom.
Second, ambiguity invites pressure. The US or China might interpret non-commitment as hostility. India must communicate transparently: its boundaries, its red lines, and its bottom lines. Recent remarks External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar on respecting India’s red lines in trade talks are a welcome example.
Third, domestic capacity matters. Non-alignment only works if India can back its policy with economic resilience, military strength, and diplomatic reach. That demands long investments in technology, infrastructure, defence, and foreign service.
A coalition of independents and India’s role
Looking ahead, the rivalry between a capricious Trump-led US and an expansionist China will likely deepen. Trump’s return has already altered foundational global bargains. China’s Belt and Road Initiative continues to extend influence across continents. The notion of a unipolar Pax Americana is no longer tenable.
In this era, India must position itself not merely as a reactor but as a shaper. By embracing non-alignment 2.0, India can lead a coalition of independents, provide diplomatic architecture for smaller states, and promote open governance rather than bloc rivalry. This coalition could propose initiatives — for trade openness, climate finance, development banking — that enlarge strategic space for the Global South.
If India succeeds, it will not merely manage the US–China rivalry; it can help moderate it. A world in which smaller states abstain from becoming pawns, and instead leverage interdependence to protect their agency, is one that resists binary confrontation. That is the promise of non-alignment 2.0.
India, by reclaiming the terrain of strategic autonomy, can pursue its national interest, deepen its soft power, and foster a Global South that is not subject to coercion, but rather actively engaged in shaping a more balanced multipolar order.