Japan’s search for defence self-reliance is easily misunderstood. Tokyo is not preparing to dispense with the United States. It cannot. American intelligence, targeting systems, logistics and nuclear deterrence remain central to Japanese security. What Japan is attempting is more consequential for Asia: it wants the capacity to fight alongside the United States, sustain operations when American supplies are scarce and arm countries that face pressure from China.
Japan’s rearmament is already altering strategic calculations in Asia Pacific. As it starts exporting warships, developing long-range missiles and surveillance technology, it promises to become a central piece of regional defence.
China has taken notice. Beijing’s objections draw force from Japan’s imperial record, but history does not fully explain its alarm. Japanese forces, shipyards and electronics companies could make it harder for China to isolate Taiwan or intimidate smaller maritime neighbours. Tokyo’s new defence policy is therefore less about national autonomy than about building a coalition that can function even when Washington hesitates.
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Japan’s defence self-reliance has limits
The post-war settlement gave Japan an unusual bargain. Article 9 of the Constitution renounced war, while the United States assumed primary responsibility for the country’s external defence. Japan concentrated on industrial recovery, kept military expenditure near 1% of gross domestic product and called its armed forces the Self-Defence Forces.
That arrangement survived because the United States was willing to bear the larger burden and because Japan’s neighbours preferred a restrained Tokyo. Neither condition is as secure as it once was.
China now deploys the world’s largest navy, a large missile force and a growing nuclear arsenal. North Korea can strike Japan with ballistic missiles. Russia’s war against Ukraine has shown that economic ties do not prevent military aggression. Donald Trump’s treatment of American alliances has supplied a further reason for doubt. Japan cannot base its security policy on the assumption that every US administration will respond in the same manner or on the same timetable.
Tokyo’s answer has been to buy greater freedom of action without weakening the alliance. Its fiscal 2026 defence programme provides ¥8.81 trillion for implementation of the Defence Buildup Programme. When related security expenditure is included, Japan has brought forward its goal of spending the equivalent of 2% of GDP on defence. The money is going into long-range missiles, ammunition stocks, unmanned systems, air and missile defence, military satellites and hardened facilities across the south-western islands. Japan’s Ministry of Defence
The decision to acquire Tomahawk cruise missiles and extend the range of Japan’s Type-12 missile deserves particular attention. For decades, Japanese governments maintained that an exclusively defensive posture imposed severe limits on the possession of strike weapons. Tokyo now argues that it must be able to attack an enemy missile site when another strike is imminent.
The distinction between defence and offence has not disappeared. It has become dependent on circumstances. China will plan for the capability rather than accept Japan’s description of it.
Japan’s defence industry moves beyond the home market
Military spending alone will not give Japan operational independence. A force that cannot replace missiles, repair ships or replenish ammunition during a prolonged conflict remains dependent on foreign production. The war in Ukraine has exposed this weakness across the industrialised world.
Japan begins with advantages. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, IHI and several electronics companies have the engineering capacity to produce advanced weapons. Japanese shipyards retain skills that have declined in parts of Europe and the United States. Yet the domestic market has been small, procurement runs have been short and companies have had little access to export orders. Unit costs consequently remained high.
The Takaichi government’s relaxation of arms-export rules in April 2026 changes that equation. Japan can now sell lethal equipment to 17 countries with which it has defence equipment transfer agreements, subject to government approval and end-use conditions. The policy gives Japanese manufacturers a chance to produce at scale and distribute development costs across foreign orders. IISS analysis, CSIS analysis
Australia’s purchase of 11 upgraded Mogami-class frigates is the first convincing evidence that Japan can become a serious defence exporter. The A$10 billion programme will begin with ships built in Japan before production moves to Western Australia. The agreement combines arms sales, technology transfer and naval interoperability. It also ties Australian maritime capability to Japanese design for several decades. Reuters
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Exports will do more than support factories. A Philippine radar connected to Japanese and American surveillance systems, or an Australian frigate built around Japanese technology, creates a continuing relationship involving training, maintenance, software and intelligence. China would then face several national forces that use compatible equipment and exchange operational information.
This is how Asia’s old hub-and-spokes system begins to change. The United States remains the hub, but the spokes are acquiring links among themselves.
Ukraine is testing Japan’s procurement culture
Japan has also studied a harder lesson from Ukraine. Modern warfare consumes cheap drones, interceptors and ammunition at rates that traditional procurement systems were not built to meet. A sophisticated weapon that takes years to approve and cannot be replaced quickly may be less useful than its specifications suggest.
Terra Drone’s investments in Ukrainian companies Amazing Drones and WinnyLab offer Japan access to interceptor designs refined under combat conditions. Japan can contribute capital, manufacturing discipline and civilian technology. Ukrainian companies bring battlefield data and much shorter development cycles. Asia Times
Whether the partnership changes Japanese procurement is another question. Japan’s large industrial groups are accustomed to exacting specifications, long negotiations and limited production runs. Ukraine’s drone industry works through frequent redesign and direct feedback from combat units. The two systems have different attitudes to failure.
Tokyo has allocated around ¥100 billion to unmanned systems under its SHIELD programme. Buying drones will be straightforward. Allowing junior officers, small firms and engineers to alter them quickly will be harder. Japan’s industrial strength can produce excellent equipment; it has yet to show that its defence bureaucracy can tolerate wartime improvisation.
Japan’s security partnerships narrow China’s options
Japan’s military expansion does not give it the capacity to defeat China independently. China’s defence expenditure, missile inventory and naval tonnage are far larger. Geography, however, gives Japanese capabilities unusual weight.
The Nansei island chain stretches towards Taiwan and sits beside important approaches to the western Pacific. Japanese submarines, anti-ship missiles, aircraft and sensors operating from these islands could restrict Chinese naval movement. American forces based in Japan would be central to any Taiwan contingency. A better-armed Japanese force would protect those bases, assist with surveillance and force the People’s Liberation Army to allocate weapons to Japanese targets.
China would have to consider Japan even if Tokyo’s final political decision to enter a conflict remained uncertain. Military planners cannot assume that Japanese bases and forces would stay outside a war after attacks on American installations in Japan.
Tokyo is also strengthening defence ties with the Philippines, Australia and India. Manila needs coastguard vessels, radars and maritime awareness more urgently than it needs expensive combat aircraft. Japan can supply such equipment without forcing the Philippines to depend entirely on Washington. Australia offers Japan a partner with space, submarine and long-range strike programmes. India brings naval reach across the Indian Ocean and a shared interest in keeping maritime routes open.
These relationships cannot be equated with an Asian NATO. The countries have different threat perceptions and no common defence obligation. South Korea’s disputes with Japan remain a serious impediment. India will not join an alliance aimed at fighting China over Taiwan. Southeast Asian governments will continue to trade heavily with Beijing.
Their cooperation can still raise the cost of Chinese coercion. A country confronting Chinese pressure will have more sources of equipment, finance and diplomatic support. Beijing will find it harder to deal with each capital separately.
China will use history against Japan
Japan cannot treat Asian memories of its wartime conduct as Chinese propaganda. Japanese occupation brought mass violence, forced labour and sexual slavery across the region. Post-war restraints reassured countries that had reason to distrust Japanese power.
Beijing exploits this history, but it does not invent it. Every argument for Japanese rearmament therefore carries a diplomatic burden. Tokyo will need greater candour about the past at the same time that it acquires weapons capable of reaching the Chinese mainland. Visits by Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine and revisionist remarks about wartime responsibility make that task needlessly difficult.
South Korea presents the sharpest test. Seoul and Tokyo face the same North Korean missile threat and share concerns about China, but disputes over colonial rule can still interrupt defence cooperation. A durable regional arrangement cannot depend on each government temporarily setting history aside.
The nuclear debate will sharpen these anxieties. Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has called for discussion without taboos as Japan reviews its security documents. That does not amount to a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Public opposition remains strong, and Japan continues to observe its three non-nuclear principles: it will not possess, produce or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons. The Japan Times, Carnegie Endowment
Even a debate over allowing American nuclear weapons into Japan would affect Chinese and South Korean calculations. It could also encourage those in Seoul who favour an independent nuclear deterrent. Japan may obtain reassurance for itself while producing greater insecurity elsewhere.
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What Japan’s rearmament means for India
India has an interest in a stronger Japanese defence industry. It offers another source of maritime technology, surveillance systems, unmanned equipment and supply-chain investment. Japanese participation can also reduce the dependence of Asian countries on American delivery schedules.
Yet New Delhi should not expect a ready-made strategic division of labour. Japan’s immediate concerns lie in the East China Sea, the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. India’s military priorities remain its continental borders, the Indian Ocean and Pakistan. Cooperation will advance where these interests overlap, particularly in anti-submarine warfare, maritime surveillance, logistics and critical technologies.
Japan’s arms-export liberalisation could revive defence-industrial cooperation that has produced more discussion than equipment. The long-running negotiations over the US-2 amphibious aircraft showed how price, technology transfer and bureaucratic caution can defeat strategic intent. Tokyo’s new rules remove one obstacle. They do not remove commercial disagreements or India’s demand for local production.
Japan will become more valuable to India if its companies can offer affordable systems, share technology and meet delivery schedules. The label of “strategic partner” cannot compensate for an uncompetitive bid.
Japan’s defence turn will not produce Asian self-reliance in the literal sense. The region still depends on American nuclear weapons, intelligence assets and military reach. Tokyo itself needs US targeting information for some of its long-range weapons. Its new intelligence structure will take years to overcome shortages in human intelligence and inter-agency coordination.
But the measure of Japan’s policy is not whether it can replace the United States. It is whether China can still assume that American allies will remain militarily weak, industrially separate and dependent on Washington for every important decision. That assumption is becoming harder to sustain.
Asia’s security order is acquiring a second layer beneath the American alliance system. Japan supplies much of the money, technology and political energy behind it. If Tokyo manages its history with honesty and its military partnerships with restraint, its rearmament could make Chinese coercion more costly without making war more likely. Failure on either count would leave Asia with more weapons and less trust.